Tag Archives: employment contracts

The Latest on Non-Competition Covenants

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On December 2, 2021, the Working for Workers Act, 2021, came into force. The Act prohibits non-competition clauses in employment or other agreements except in the context of a sale of the business, or if the employee operates at an executive level. The effective date of the Act is October 25, 2021. The Court has held that it does not apply to agreements entered into prior to that date.

Non-competition clauses have always been fertile ground for litigation simply because many employers consider them vital to their business. But, they are also very difficult to enforce. At the end of the day, at common law, the enforceability of such clauses depends on whether or not a court considers them reasonable. For that reason, it is important for both employers and employees to give careful thought to how a Court will make that determination when negotiating the terms of a non-competition clause.

In the recent case of M & P Drug Mart Inc. v. Norton and Whitehead Pharmacy Ltd., the Ontario Court of Appeal took the opportunity to review this process.

Norton, a pharmacist, had been the pharmacy manager of a pharmacy owned by M & P in Huntsville, Ontario. His employment agreement contained a non-competition covenant. The clause in issue provided that for one year after the termination of Norton’s employment for any reason, he would not “carry on, or be engaged in, concerned with, or interested in, directly or indirectly, any undertaking involving any business the same as, similar to, or competitive with the business within the 15 km radius of the business located at 10 Main Street East, Huntsville, Ontario”.

The agreement also provided an acknowledgement on Norton’s part that the clause was necessary to protect M & P’s legitimate business interests and was reasonable in the circumstances.

Norton resigned and became an employee at a pharmacy less than 3 km away.

M & P sued Norton and the matter was determined by Application. The Application judge found the covenant to be unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. The Application was dismissed. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal began its analysis by observing that, as a general rule and on public policy grounds, a non-competition clause is unenforceable unless it is reasonable considering the interests of the parties and the public based on the circumstances at the time that the covenant is made. In order to determine whether the clause is reasonable, the Court will consider the extent of the activity to be prohibited, the geographic coverage of the restriction, and its duration. The covenant must be clear as to activity, time and geography. If it is ambiguous on any of these factors, it is likely to be considered unenforceable simply because the ambiguity will make it impossible to show that it is reasonable.

If the covenant is clear and unambiguous, it will then be assessed for reasonableness. The Court will not rewrite the covenant in accordance with what it thinks is reasonable. If it is unreasonable, the Court will simply decline to enforce it.

In this case, M & P argued that the clause merely restricted Norton from working as a pharmacist for a pharmacy or a store that includes a pharmacy. However, the words contained in the clause went well beyond this restriction. In the view of the Court, the covenant would have prohibited Norton from working in a job at a supermarket, for example, that included a pharmacy department, even if his job was in a completely different department and he was not employed as a pharmacist. Furthermore, Norton would have been prevented by the clause from being a passive investor in any such business.

As it happens, Norton did become re-employed as a pharmacist. Nevertheless, as the clause included activities beyond working as a pharmacist, it was considered overly broad and, therefore, unenforceable.

The jurisprudence is filled with cases in which a non-competition clause was found to be unenforceable. This is because historically, employers have insisted on protections well beyond what is truly necessary, thinking that inclusion of an acknowledgment by the employee that the employer’s concerns are reasonable will preserve the clause.

While the number of such cases will start to decrease given the new legislation, the vast majority of contracts existing today that include such clauses will not be subject to the legislation. They will continue to be litigated, and Courts will continue to be vigilant in protecting the ability of employees to make a living elsewhere unless the clause restricting the new employment is eminently reasonable.

Even with the new legislation, the common law will apply to “executive” employees. In addition, this issue will arise in the context of the sale of businesses. In the latter cases, while the attitude of the Court has always been more generous to parties seeking to enforce non-competition covenants, the issue of reasonability will continue to be one to which attention must be paid.

When Can an Employment Agreement be Voided for Duress?

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The recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Riskie v. Sony of Canada Ltd. provides a useful reminder of the way in which the court will deal with an employment agreement where the employee later complains that he executed the agreement under duress.

In this case, Mr. Riskie was a management level employee of Sony of Canada Ltd. based in Toronto. He began working at Sony in 1989 without a written employment agreement. He lived and worked in Toronto.

In the spring of 2014, after having worked at Sony for about 25 years, he announced that his wife had obtained new employment and that he and his family were planning to move to Ottawa. He asked whether he could continue in his existing job from his home in Ottawa notwithstanding that there were a number of Toronto-based employees reporting to him.

While Mr. Riskie’s immediate superior was supportive, Sony’s President and CEO was opposed to the idea.

Mr. Riskie planned to move to Ottawa in mid-June 2014, even though he knew of senior management’s opposition to the idea of his continuing to work from there. Several days before the move, his immediate superior advised him that Sony would consider accommodating his request but would require that his position change from that of an indefinite employee to a contract employee with a fixed term, as a condition of approving the arrangement.

Mr. Riskie was given a proposed contract with a fixed term ending December 31, 2014, with no renewal rights. He was able to negotiate the end date to March 31, 2015. He asked for a right to renew the contract unless he failed to prove that the new arrangement could work, but that request was denied. Ultimately, he signed the contract after he had already moved to Ottawa. At no time was he ever told that he could not remain in Toronto and continue in the same capacity as before by, for example, commuting to Ottawa on weekends.

Mr. Riskie proceeded to carry on his previous duties remotely from Ottawa. Several months later, Sony announced internally that its North American operations were being reorganized. A number of people were let go in February 2015 and at that time, Mr. Riskie was told that his contract would not be renewed on its expiration date.

At that date, he was provided with all of the benefits called for under his fixed term employment agreement. Mr. Riskie responded by suing Sony for wrongful dismissal, saying that the employment agreement was void for a variety of reasons. One of his arguments was that he signed it under duress. Sony insisted that the agreement was valid and Mr. Riskie brought a motion for summary judgment.

At the motion, Mr. Riskie argued that he had been required to sign the contract “in order to continue the teleworking arrangement from Ottawa” even though he had already moved before actually signing the contract. On cross-examination, he admitted that had had the option of signing the contract and accepting its terms, resigning and looking for alternative employment, or returning to Toronto on a full-time basis. He admitted that he preferred to sign the contract and make every effort to demonstrate its value to Sony so as to convince Sony to extend it.

The court pointed out that there is a five-part list of criteria to determine whether or not an employment agreement was executed under duress.

Firstly, the court will consider whether the party protested at the time that the contract was entered into. In this case, the court found that while Mr. Riskie had protested numerous aspects of the proposed deal, he never protested that he was being placed under duress at the time that he actually signed it. He acknowledged that he had been given several weeks to think it over and the court concluded that this was not consistent with coercion or duress.

Secondly, the court will consider whether there is an effective alternative course open to the party alleging duress. In this case, Mr. Riskie certainly had the alternative of staying in Toronto and commuting frequently but he declined to select it.

Thirdly, the court will consider whether the party received independent legal advice. The court concluded that as a highly paid senior executive, Mr. Riskie could have sought such advice if he had chosen to do so. There was no time pressure applied to him to preclude him from seeking advice and he had the means, the time and the opportunity to do so.

Fourthly, the court will consider whether, after entering into the contract, the party took any steps to get out of it. In this case, no such steps were taken and there was no suggestion that Mr. Riskie did anything other than to perform his duties to the best of his ability.

Finally, the court will consider whether the party was placed under any illegitimate pressure. In this case, the court found that Mr. Riskie could have simply resumed his duties full time in Toronto had he chosen to do so. While his reasons could be readily understood, not having a preferred option available is not a test for duress. There must be an illegitimate application of coercive pressure in order to void a contract for duress. In this case, Sony had no obligation to accommodate the move to Ottawa and every right to propose terms on which it might do so. There was nothing wrong in Sony attaching conditions to its willingness to accommodate Mr. Riskie’s request.

As a result, there was no basis for concluding that the employment agreement was entered into under duress.

After disposing of Mr. Riskie’s other arguments, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

With increasing frequency, companies with employees of indefinite duration are turning to written employment contracts with those employees and asking them to execute them during the course of their employment. There a number of rules that have been established by the jurisprudence that must be followed for those contracts to be enforceable. This case provides useful clarification as to the circumstances under which such an agreement may be set aside for duress.

When Can A Former Employee Compete?

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In the recent case of Optilinx Systems Inc. v. Fiberco Solutions Inc., the Superior Court of Ontario provided a useful reminder as to the circumstances in which a former employee is entitled to compete with his former employer.

In this case, Mr. Foresta had been employed by Optilinx as the project manager of its fiber optic division. He was not an owner, officer or director of the company and he was not bound by any non-competition or non-solicitation agreement. He was not involved in management at a senior level. However, he was regarded by the company as a key employee and, in fact, he was its highest paid staff employee when he resigned in August 2014 after 12 years of employment.

The company’s customers were major Canadian telecommunications companies such as Bell Canada and Rogers. It did not have exclusive contracts with its customers and it competed for their business against other fiber optic cable companies. Mr. Foresta was the company’s main but not its exclusive salesperson with its customers, reporting directly to the company’s owner.

In the months before his departure, he indicated to other employees in confidence that he was planning to leave and start his own business that would compete with the company. He suggested to them that they would be welcome to join him in the new business and that they should seriously consider doing so because his departure would imperil the company’s business success.

In the summer of 2014, he incorporated his own company and obtained $300,000 in financing. He then resigned. Shortly afterwards, four other company employees resigned to join him.

After his departure, he re-entered the fiber optic cable business through his new company.

Optilinx’s case against Mr. Foresta was that he was no ordinary employee, but rather a key employee owing fiduciary duties to his employer. The company sought an injunction to stop Mr. Foresta from doing business with several of the company’s largest customers.

To the court, however, while Mr. Foresta may have been a very important and productive employee, and even the lynchpin to the company’s success, he was not an owner, director, shareholder or a member of management. His importance as an employee did not mean that he was a fiduciary. In this case, the company was unable to establish a sufficiently strong case that Mr. Foresta occupied the position of a fiduciary.

As the court noted, there is nothing to prevent an ordinary employee from terminating his employment, at which point that employee is free to compete with his former employer unless there exists a contract preventing him to do so. On the other hand, a fiduciary occupies a position of loyalty and trust and is not permitted to allow his own self-interest to conflict with those duties. However, even a fiduciary who terminates his employment is entitled to accept business from former clients, although a fiduciary may not directly solicit business from former clients. In this case, even if Mr. Foresta did have fiduciary responsibilities, there was no evidence that he had actively solicited business from the company’s customers.

The situation would have been different had there been evidence that Mr. Foresta had taken confidential information such as customer lists, or stolen trade secrets, from his employer. That type of conduct is unlawful and the court will step in, in those circumstances. However, as this case reminds us, where the departing employee is not a fiduciary, the rules are very different.

When Will the Court Refuse to Enforce an Arbitration Clause?

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The recent Ontario Court decision in Hargraft Schofield LP v. Fluke provides some interesting reminders as to problems that can arise when one attempts to enforce an arbitration clause in a contract.

In this case, the plaintiff sued its former employer for an alleged breach of a variety of clauses in the employment agreement that had existed between them.

The parties had entered into an employment agreement in June 2000 with a three-year fixed term. The agreement included an arbitration clause that required that all disputes relating to the agreement would have to be referred to arbitration.

After the first employment agreement expired, the parties entered into a second employment agreement for another fixed term. That document did not include an arbitration clause. It did include a clause providing that it represented the entire agreement between them.

Over the ensuing years, the parties entered into further employment agreements as the terms of each one expired. Eleven years after the first agreement had been entered into, the defendant resigned.

Several months after the defendant’s resignation, the plaintiff sued in Ontario Court. Over the course of the next two years and ten months, the dispute proceeded through the litigation process. The parties exchanged pleadings, negotiated a discovery plan, agreed to a timetable for the balance of the steps in the action, exchanged sworn affidavits of documents, scheduled examinations for discovery, and conducted a mediation (which failed). The defendant then raised the argument that the matter should be proceeding by way of arbitration. The plaintiff refused to change its course of action and the defendant brought a motion for an order staying the action and referring the issues to arbitration.

The first question that the court dealt with had to do with whether or not there even existed an arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties. The initial employment agreement had contained such a clause but the court found that it had been superseded by the second employment agreement which did not include such a clause. Even though one of the subsequent employment agreements specifically indicated that the defendant’s employment would continue on the same terms and conditions as had been contained in all of the previous agreements, so that they were deemed to be incorporated in the most recent agreement, the court determined that as the first agreement had been superseded by the second, and the second included an “entire agreement” clause, there did not exist a valid arbitration clause upon which the defendant could rely.

One of the interesting points in this respect had to do with whether or not the court even had the jurisdiction to make this decision. The Ontario Arbitration Act provides that:

    “An arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration and may in that connection rule on objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.”

It was suggested that based on that provision, where there is an issue as to whether or not there even exists a valid arbitration clause, an arbitrator would have to be appointed to make that determination. Fortunately, in this case, the court took a more common sense approach and considered that this provision in the Act was not mandatory and that the court had the jurisdiction to determine whether or not an arbitration clause was in existence.

Secondly, the court went on to consider whether or not, if there did exist an arbitration clause, there was a valid basis for refusing to refer the matter to arbitration. The court pointed out that while the Arbitration Act requires the court to stay a proceeding that has been commenced in the face of a valid arbitration clause, there are exceptions. One of the exceptions arises where a motion for a stay of the proceeding is brought with undue delay.

The court pointed to the fact that almost three years had elapsed since the law suit had started. During that time, there had been a substantial amount of progress made along the litigation path. The court seemed to suggest that the defendant had either forgotten about the arbitration clause, or deliberately refrained from insisting on arbitration until after the mediation had failed. While not stated in the court’s decision, the idea that the defendant was now raising this argument merely to delay may also have been a concern.

In any event, the court dismissed the motion and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial in the usual course.

Among other things, this is an important reminder to parties to a contract with an arbitration clause that if they do not address the arbitration clause promptly but rather proceed by way of a legal action, they may lose the ability to insist on arbitration at a later date.