So You’ve Lost Your Arbitration: Now What?

It has been commonplace to include arbitration clauses in commercial agreements. The benefits of arbitrating disputes rather than litigating over them are well known. Arbitrations are usually considered to be a cheaper and faster way to adjudicate disputes than litigation. Typically, arbitrations are seen to be the better approach particularly when the parties expect to continue to do business with each other after the dispute has been resolved. For example, where a dispute arises during a contract where the performance of obligations by each side is expected to continue on a long-term basis and the dispute is not serious enough for either party to actually terminate the agreement, arbitrations are thought to be a somewhat less acrimonious and certainly more efficient way of handling the issue at hand.

Often, one of the key features of arbitration has to do with the limits on appeal rights. It is not uncommon for an arbitration clause to provide that there simply is no appeal of any kind from the arbitrator’s decision.

A limit on appeals may seem like a good idea at the time the contract is signed. Presumably, neither party actually anticipates there is going to be a dispute during the course of the business relationship and it may provide some comfort to know that if there is a dispute, its resolution will not be dragged out by an appeal process.

However, this feature becomes a lot less appealing when one engages in an arbitration to resolve a dispute and loses. What then?

An arbitration provision that provides that the arbitration’s decision is final will be interpreted by the court in exactly that manner – as final. If it turns out that the arbitrator didn’t understand the evidence or simply got it wrong in the opinion of one of the parties (or perhaps both), that’s simply too bad. That is a risk that one takes when entering into such an agreement. Presumably, the risk cuts both ways.

Having said that, in Ontario, the Arbitration Act does provide for some recourse in certain circumstances. Section 46 of the Act allows an unhappy party to ask the court to set aside an arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator failed to conduct the hearing in a procedurally fair manner. For example, an award can be set aside by a party who is not treated equally and fairly, was not given an opportunity to present its case or respond to the opponent’s case, or was not given proper notice of the arbitration or the appointment of an arbitrator.

There is often a temptation to bring such a motion on the basis of allegedly unequal or unfair treatment when all that has really happened is that one of the parties does not like the award. In the recent case of Aquanta Group Inc. et al. v. Lightbox Enterprises Ltd., 2023 ONSC 971, Aquanta applied to the court for an order to set aside the award because a few days before the commencement of the arbitration, the arbitrator dismissed its motion to amend its pleading. The arbitrator, a retired trial judge, had considered the arguments on both sides and exercised his discretion to dismiss the motion and require the arbitration to proceed as scheduled.

At the motion to set the award aside, Aquanta argued that the arbitrator’s refusal to allow it to amend its pleading amounted to unfair and unequal treatment. The court disagreed and dismissed the motion.

In doing so, the judge relied on a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal released in December 2022 called Tall Ships Development Inc. v. Brockville (City), 2022 ONCA 861. In that case, the Court of Appeal made it abundantly clear that the basis for setting aside an award for procedural unfairness is extremely narrow. That provision of the Act “is not concerned with the substance of the parties’ dispute and is not to be treated as an alternate appeal route.”

Accordingly, it appears clear that at a motion to set aside an award, the court will not consider the substantive issues in the dispute. It will only concern itself with matters of a procedural nature. In the Lightbox decision, for example, the issue was not whether or not the arbitrator exercised his discretion correctly or even reasonably. The only issue was whether or not the arbitrator had the jurisdiction to make the decision that he made. As the arbitrator acted within the bounds of the authority granted to him by the arbitration agreement, that ended the matter. Arbitration clauses in commercial agreements have become popular because they offer the possibility of a speedy resolution to disputes. However, an arbitration provision with no appeal rights does present some element of risk which should be considered carefully before the agreement is signed.

The Latest on the Duty of Good Faith in Real Estate Transactions

The case of Sarai et al. v. Singh et al., 2023 ONSC 2102 (CanLII) is an important reminder of the duty of parties to a real estate transaction to act in good faith.

In this Application to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, three applicants entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with three respondents on May 24, 2021, for the purchase of a 14-acre property in Caledon to be used by the applicants to accommodate their growing trucking business. The transaction had a closing date of November 30, 2021.

The agreement provided that the applicants would provide their $100,000 deposit to the respondents’ lawyer in trust within 48 hours of the respondents’ acceptance of their offer.

However, the respondents did not bother to tell the applicants who their lawyer was until May 28, 2021.

Within 24 hours thereafter, the applicants provided that lawyer with a bank draft to satisfy the deposit. The bank draft was accepted by the respondents’ lawyer.

Over five months later, on the day before closing, one of the respondents, a Mr. Singh, notified the applicants that he did not intend to close. Singh’s position was that the delivery of the deposit was too late because it was not within 48 hours of acceptance. The applicants had therefore breached the agreement and thus Singh did not have to close.

The applicants asked the court to declare that the agreement was binding and to require the respondents to close the transaction. They argued that the respondents had conducted themselves as if the agreement was binding until just before closing. Specific performance was the appropriate remedy because the property was so unique that damages would not be an adequate remedy. Finally, they argued that Singh was acting in bad faith by relying on the deposit clause when the respondents had failed to identify their lawyer, to whom the deposit was to be delivered, until after the deadline.

Singh pointed out that the applicants could have delivered the deposit directly to the respondents within the 48 hours and that, having failed to do so, the applicants had breached a fundamental term of the agreement of purchase and sale.

The court had no hesitation in granting the application. The respondents had made strict performance of the deposit condition impossible by delaying in identifying their lawyer. Furthermore, they waived strict compliance with that deadline by accepting the deposit when it was delivered.

The court also considered Singh’s failure to notify the applicants in writing about his position until the very last moment to be completely unreasonable. Singh did not act in good faith and, given the uniqueness of the property and this unreasonable behaviour, the applicants were entitled to specific performance.

There are a number of important lessons to learn from this decision.

Firstly, the court will have no sympathy for behaviour that is patently unreasonable. If a party to a transaction intends to take the position that the agreement has been breached by the other party, it is incumbent upon that party to give timely written notice of that position. A failure to do so may be considered unreasonable and bad faith behaviour.

Secondly, if one wishes to take such a position, it is critical that one not act in a manner that is inconsistent with that position. In this case, acceptance of the deposit after the 48-hour deadline period contemplated by the agreement amounted to a waiver of that deadline so that it could not be relied upon at a later date as a breach of the agreement of purchase and sale. Thirdly, where a party has an obligation to do something, the other party cannot make satisfaction of that obligation impossible and then claim that the agreement has been breached.

The Latest on Non-Competition Covenants

On December 2, 2021, the Working for Workers Act, 2021, came into force. The Act prohibits non-competition clauses in employment or other agreements except in the context of a sale of the business, or if the employee operates at an executive level. The effective date of the Act is October 25, 2021. The Court has held that it does not apply to agreements entered into prior to that date.

Non-competition clauses have always been fertile ground for litigation simply because many employers consider them vital to their business. But, they are also very difficult to enforce. At the end of the day, at common law, the enforceability of such clauses depends on whether or not a court considers them reasonable. For that reason, it is important for both employers and employees to give careful thought to how a Court will make that determination when negotiating the terms of a non-competition clause.

In the recent case of M & P Drug Mart Inc. v. Norton and Whitehead Pharmacy Ltd., the Ontario Court of Appeal took the opportunity to review this process.

Norton, a pharmacist, had been the pharmacy manager of a pharmacy owned by M & P in Huntsville, Ontario. His employment agreement contained a non-competition covenant. The clause in issue provided that for one year after the termination of Norton’s employment for any reason, he would not “carry on, or be engaged in, concerned with, or interested in, directly or indirectly, any undertaking involving any business the same as, similar to, or competitive with the business within the 15 km radius of the business located at 10 Main Street East, Huntsville, Ontario”.

The agreement also provided an acknowledgement on Norton’s part that the clause was necessary to protect M & P’s legitimate business interests and was reasonable in the circumstances.

Norton resigned and became an employee at a pharmacy less than 3 km away.

M & P sued Norton and the matter was determined by Application. The Application judge found the covenant to be unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. The Application was dismissed. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal began its analysis by observing that, as a general rule and on public policy grounds, a non-competition clause is unenforceable unless it is reasonable considering the interests of the parties and the public based on the circumstances at the time that the covenant is made. In order to determine whether the clause is reasonable, the Court will consider the extent of the activity to be prohibited, the geographic coverage of the restriction, and its duration. The covenant must be clear as to activity, time and geography. If it is ambiguous on any of these factors, it is likely to be considered unenforceable simply because the ambiguity will make it impossible to show that it is reasonable.

If the covenant is clear and unambiguous, it will then be assessed for reasonableness. The Court will not rewrite the covenant in accordance with what it thinks is reasonable. If it is unreasonable, the Court will simply decline to enforce it.

In this case, M & P argued that the clause merely restricted Norton from working as a pharmacist for a pharmacy or a store that includes a pharmacy. However, the words contained in the clause went well beyond this restriction. In the view of the Court, the covenant would have prohibited Norton from working in a job at a supermarket, for example, that included a pharmacy department, even if his job was in a completely different department and he was not employed as a pharmacist. Furthermore, Norton would have been prevented by the clause from being a passive investor in any such business.

As it happens, Norton did become re-employed as a pharmacist. Nevertheless, as the clause included activities beyond working as a pharmacist, it was considered overly broad and, therefore, unenforceable.

The jurisprudence is filled with cases in which a non-competition clause was found to be unenforceable. This is because historically, employers have insisted on protections well beyond what is truly necessary, thinking that inclusion of an acknowledgment by the employee that the employer’s concerns are reasonable will preserve the clause.

While the number of such cases will start to decrease given the new legislation, the vast majority of contracts existing today that include such clauses will not be subject to the legislation. They will continue to be litigated, and Courts will continue to be vigilant in protecting the ability of employees to make a living elsewhere unless the clause restricting the new employment is eminently reasonable.

Even with the new legislation, the common law will apply to “executive” employees. In addition, this issue will arise in the context of the sale of businesses. In the latter cases, while the attitude of the Court has always been more generous to parties seeking to enforce non-competition covenants, the issue of reasonability will continue to be one to which attention must be paid.

Wrongful Dismissal and Mitigation: What is the Extent of the Employee’s Obligation?

In the recent case of Lake v. La Presse (2018) Inc., the Ontario Superior Court provided some useful guidance concerning an employee’s obligation to mitigate damages when there has been a wrongful dismissal.

In this case, the Plaintiff had been employed by the Defendant for 5.5 years. The employment was terminated without cause and there was no issue as to the fact that the Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable notice at common law.

The matter came before the Court as a summary judgment motion to determine the reasonable notice period, compensation for loss of a bonus over the reasonable notice period, and whether or not the Plaintiff took reasonable steps to mitigate her damages.

The particularly interesting aspect of this case has to do with the mitigation question.

In my experience, it is typical in these cases for former employees to produce evidence of unsuccessful job applications and leave it to the former employer to lead evidence at trial that, had more diligent efforts been made, the former employee would have become re-employed much sooner than actually was the case. Most employers find this to be an extremely difficult task.

In this case, the Plaintiff was the most senior employee in the Toronto division of a company that carried on business as a daily online French-language newspaper based in Montreal. The Plaintiff had ample experience working in sales and sales operations for media companies. She reported to the Vice-President of Sales and Operations of the Defendant, who was based in Montreal. Her duties included client development, training and management of sales teams, and developing and implementing the Defendant’s sales strategies. However, she did not attend weekly executive meetings or participate in setting strategic direction within the organization.

Her employment ended on May 30, 2019. At that time, she was 52 years of age. At the time of the motion, about two years later, she remained unemployed.

The Court noted that the onus is on the Defendant to demonstrate that the Plaintiff did not mitigate damages and that the onus is not a light one. However, where the Defendant overcomes that onus, the notice period can be reduced or eliminated altogether.

The Court pointed out that the Plaintiff was entitled, firstly, to some reasonable period of time before starting the job search in order to adjust to the situation and plan for the future, and secondly, to seek out reasonably comparable work for which she was qualified. However, after a reasonable period of attempting to find similar work, a Plaintiff must, at some point, lower her sights and take a lesser paying job, or use her skills in a perhaps unrelated industry.

Considering the Plaintiff’s position, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff should have been ready to begin her job search after a one-month adjustment period. In the year following the termination, she applied for 11 jobs, nine of which were for a vice president role, which was a more senior title than one that she had ever had. Accordingly, she focused her job search on a role that represented a promotion over her prior role.

The Court found that the appropriate notice period was nine months. In that time frame, the Plaintiff only applied for seven positions, six of which were a vice president role. Her first job application was submitted four and a half months after she stopped working for the Defendant.

Taking these facts into account, and apparently without any direct evidence from the Defendant as to available jobs, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff had failed to properly mitigate her damages. She should have started her search earlier, expanded the parameters of her job search, and applied for more positions in more junior roles. Accordingly, the period of reasonable notice to which she was entitled was reduced by two months. This case provides the useful reminder as to the seriousness with which the search for alternate employment must be pursued. It also demonstrates that while the onus to prove a failure to mitigate is always on the Defendant, that onus can be met if the Plaintiff can be shown to have acted unreasonably and without proper diligence.

Can Electronic Signatures Be Declared Invalid?

Our new reality over the last year and a half has meant that in large measure, documents of all kinds have been signed electronically rather than in person – including sworn documents to be filed in Court. But what if someone denies having “signed” an electronic document?

In Ontario, the Electronic Commerce Act, 2000, provides for the legal recognition of electronic information in documents. While there are exceptions, such as wills and codicils as well as powers of attorney relating to an individual’s financial affairs or personal care, for the most part, the Act provides that an electronic document will be as effective as an originally-signed paper document provided that the electronic signature is reliable for the purpose of identifying the person, and the association of the electronic signature with the relevant electronic document is reliable. The Act does not specify how reliability is established. If some doubt can be raised as to the reliability of the application of an electronic signature, the document may be rendered invalid.

The question of how one can best assure reliability was recently addressed in the Texas Supreme Court case of Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd. In Texas, legislation similar to that of Ontario is provided by the Texas Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which provides that an electronic signature is attributable to a person by showing the effectiveness of the security procedures in place when the document was electronically signed.

In Aerotek, Inc., a number of contractors were hired by the plaintiff through an online hiring application process. Upon request, the plaintiff sent the applicants an email that provided a link to a registration page. On that page, each applicant created a user ID and a password and set up security questions. Each time an applicant accessed the system, this information was required to be inputted.

As the process of making the applications developed, each applicant had to sign an Electronic Disclosure Agreement agreeing to be bound by electronic contracts as if they had been signed in writing.

The process could not be completed without all of the contracts involved in the process being signed electronically. As documents were signed, those actions were recorded electronically with a time stamp. The system was designed so that the plaintiff could not alter any of this information.

Ultimately, four applicants completed the process and were hired. They were terminated and proceeded to sue the plaintiff. The plaintiff responded by insisting that the disputes be referred to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in one of the documents that had been electronically signed. Each contractor then denied ever having seen, signed, or been presented with the document containing the arbitration clause.

Accordingly, the Court had to determine whether or not the electronic signatures were valid.

The Court concluded that there would be several different ways in which a party relying on an electronic document could prove the connection between an individual and an electronic signature. This would include requiring personal identifying information to register for an account, assigning a unique identifier to a user, taking steps to prevent unauthorized access to electronic records, requiring users to complete all steps in a process before moving forward, and using time stamps to show when actions were completed.

In this case, the Court concluded that the security procedures used by the plaintiff were sufficient to demonstrate that the electronic signatures could be attributed to the four contractors notwithstanding their sworn denials about ever having seen, signed, or been presented with the relevant contract. Accordingly, where documents are to be exchanged electronically, it is important to establish security procedures along the foregoing lines in order to be able to demonstrate reliability as required by the Ontario statute. If there are any gaps in the process that might give rise to a question as to its reliability, the document may well be invalidated.

Seven Major Mistakes Counsel Make at Mediations

One of the advantages that I think I have as both a litigator and a mediator is that I get to use the knowledge that I have gained in one capacity to make me better at the other.

For example, as a mediator, I have seen counsel repeatedly make the same errors, often resulting in a mediation failing or at least making the task of achieving a settlement more difficult, time consuming, and expensive for all concerned. I try to be mindful of these things when acting as counsel on a mediation. In this post, in no particular order, here are seven major mistakes that I see all too often.

1. Failing to Put in Sufficient Thought and Effort into a Mediation Brief

All too often, I see mediation briefs that are little more than a reiteration of the party’s pleading. There may be one or two documents included as an afterthought. Presumably, the lawyer’s idea is to actually prepare for the mediation the night before, rather than a week before, when the mediation brief is prepared. This is completely unhelpful. By the time the case has reached mediation, at the very least, there should be an exchange of productions, if not completed examinations, for discovery. Thoughtful preparation is important. As in most cases, the more effort one puts in, the more likely something productive will emerge by the end of the process.

2. Not Preparing One’s Own Client for What to Expect from the Other Side

Most clients have great difficulty appreciating that theirs is not the only side of the story. This often can lead to extreme dismay and discouragement early in the mediation process. The client does not have to agree that their case has holes, but the client should certainly be aware of what is being said by the opposing side before the mediation starts.

3. Making Inflammatory Remarks

In mediations that I conduct, I try to discourage counsel from making opening statements or permitting their clients to do so. Nevertheless, in some cases I am overruled. Counsel, or the client, then proceeds to open the mediation by saying something that angers the other side to the extent that their cause immediately attracts two strikes against it. If your client wishes to vent, please do so in private, with me. If the client insists that the opposing side hear what they have to say, let me know in advance so that I can tell opposing counsel, who can then prepare their client.

4. Fighting Battles on Unwinnable Points

A wise senior counsel once said to me, “why fight a battle you can’t win?” There are those counsel who believe that the more arguments one makes, the more likely it is that one of them will stick. That is simply not true. Poor arguments are dismissed immediately and the lack of credibility attracted by the making of unwinnable arguments usually taints the valid arguments.

5. Being Unreasonably Tough, Thinking that there will be Time to Settle Later

The truth is that while there will be plenty of time after an unsuccessful mediation in which a settlement might take place, it is highly unlikely that there will be a better opportunity to settle. Furthermore, the client will have to spend a lot more money between the date of the mediation and the date that another settlement opportunity arises, which will have to be recouped in order to have made the delay worthwhile.

6. Making Offers that Both Counsel and His or Her Client Know to be Unrealistic

Making an obviously unrealistic offer does not communicate the idea that you are hard-nosed. Nor does it start the bargaining at a point that is high or low enough that the ultimate agreement, if there is one, will be based on a better number than it would have been if your initial offer been realistic. All it does mean is that you either don’t know what you are doing or are not serious about resolving the case. Stop wasting everyone’s time, and be realistic. You can stick to your guns if you like, but if you do make a ridiculous offer, all you will attract is an equally ridiculous counteroffer.

7. Failing to Educate Your Client About the Costs of Litigation Going Forward

When faced with obstinacy, I usually find it helpful to have a discussion with a lawyer and the client about anticipated costs going forward. I am often surprised that the numbers revealed are numbers the client had never been told. This is an error. Just as the client is entitled to your advice on the probabilities of success or failure in the case, they are entitled to a budget for the rest of the case, including trial, so that the client can factor this into his or her thinking about offers to be made or offers received.

When Will an Employee’s Misconduct Justify Dismissal Without Notice?

In the recently-decided case of Czerniawski v. Corma Inc., Mr. Czerniawski’s employment was terminated without notice after 19 years of service because of alleged misconduct. The court had to address the question of whether or not the misconduct justified such an extreme measure.

Mr. Czerniawski was an assembler in a company that manufactured products in the corrugated plastic pipe industry. During his 19 years with the company, he was a good worker, and there had been no issues with his job performance. The only performance review he had ever received concluded that he was a solid, steady worker who was competent, dependable, and hard-working.

Unfortunately, Mr. Czerniawski had an angry exchange with a co-worker concerning items missing from his work station. There was evidence before the court that in the course of the encounter Mr. Czerniawski was screaming, pointing, and waving his arms. Both Mr. Czerniawski and the co-worker were angry, and voices were loud. There was no physical contact between these individuals and no threats were exchanged.

Mr. Czerniawski was asked to leave the workplace. He asked to be informed as to why he was being sent home, but no answer was provided and he refused to leave. The police were called in to escort him out of the building. He was told that his employer would conduct an investigation and that he was not to return to work until that process had been completed.

He went back to the workplace several days later to deliver a letter at the reception desk. The letter put forward Mr. Czerniawski’s side of the story.

Mr. Czerniawski was never consulted during the course of the investigation and when it was completed, Mr. Czerniawski’s employment was terminated without notice. Mr. Czerniawski then commenced this lawsuit, claiming that his employment had been wrongfully terminated and that he was entitled to reasonable notice of termination.

The trial judge had found that Mr. Czerniawski’s failure to go home when told to do so was insubordinate, but she also took into account the fact that he had asked why he was being sent home and that his question had not been answered.

She also felt that his attendance at the reception desk to deliver the letter was ill-advised, but noted that this had taken place four days after the incident had occurred, during which time no one from the company contacted him to discuss the issue or get his version of the facts. Furthermore, while he did go to the factory to deliver the letter, he made no attempt to go into the plant.

The trial judge concluded that had Mr. Czerniawski been permitted to respond to the allegations of misconduct with his side of the story as part of the investigation, the employer’s decision to terminate may have been different. In essence, she felt that the decision to terminate was out of proportion to the actual misconduct. As a result, she ruled that Mr. Czerniawski had been wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages equal to the notice to which he was entitled at common law.

There is no doubt that there are circumstances in which misconduct, including insubordination, can amount to just cause for termination without notice. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that in arriving at this determination, the entire context must be considered. The misconduct has to be so grievous that “it intimates the employee’s abandonment of the intention to remain part of the employment relationship.” As a result, one must consider the particular facts of the alleged misconduct as well as the employee’s tenure and discipline history. A balance must be struck between the severity of the misconduct and the penalty that is imposed.

In this case, given the employee’s long and clean record and the extenuating circumstances surrounding his behavior and starting from the moment he was asked to leave the factory, the judge felt that termination was a disproportionate response to Mr. Czerniawski’s behaviour. Instead, the employer should have imposed some form of progressive discipline for the incident such as a disciplinary letter or a suspension in order to send the message that the behavior was unacceptable, including a warning that further behaviour of this nature could result in a dismissal. This is an important lesson for employers confronted with this type of situation. Where a long term employee, with a clean record, behaves unacceptably, it is critical that the employer ensure that the employee understands the nature of any disciplinary action being imposed, and that the employee is given every opportunity to tell his or her side of the story before a decision is made as to any penalty to be imposed. It is difficult to imagine how an employer can impose a penalty that is in proportion to the offence without first obtaining the employee’s side of the story and thereby obtaining a complete understanding of the events in issue. An employer who fails to take this step may end up making a costly mistake.