Nonpayment of Rent: The Latest on Relief from Forfeiture

The recent Superior Court decision in 7984987 Canada Incorporated v. Lixo Investments, provides a useful summary and update of the law on the relief from forfeiture.

Ontario’s Commercial Tenancies Act provides that where a tenant is in default with respect to a rent payment of 15 days or more, the landlord can exercise its remedies including termination of the lease (unless the lease itself provides otherwise).

Normally, when the default is merely for nonpayment of rent, relief from forfeiture will be granted.

Landlords do not normally pounce on tenants on the 16th day after a rent cheque either doesn’t arrive or bounces.  Such events are normally followed by communication between the parties often resulting in the payment being made. 

If the tenant is prepared and able to remedy the default, but the landlord decides that it would prefer to end the relationship, the tenant still has an option.  The same statute provides that the tenant can apply to the court for what is referred to as relief against forfeiture.  The tenant can ask the court to require the landlord to accept the late rental payment and allow the tenant back into the premises.  Continue reading

Is There an Implied Contractual Duty of Good Faith?

From time to time, a party to a commercial contract will feel that the other party to the contract has treated him improperly or unfairly.  A review of the contract, however, does not reveal any specific provisions that have been breached by the other party’s offending conduct.  In those circumstances, is there any room to argue that the other party had a duty implied in the contract to act in good faith, and breached the contract by failing to do so?

This question has been put before the court on a number of occasions over the last several years.  On each occasion, a Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant had an implied contractual duty to act honestly and in good faith in the performance of a contract between the parties.  The duty is said to be implied simply because there is no explicit term in the contract that specifies the existence of such a duty. 

A duty of good faith has been implied to make sure that parties do not act in a way that defeats the essential objective of the contract.

In the past, when the court has referred to the existence of a duty of good faith, it is done so in circumstances in which the case was decided on the basis of established legal principles.  As one judge has said, “Canadian courts have not developed a comprehensive and principled approach to the implication of duties of good faith in commercial contracts”. 

This issue was very recently addressed again by the Ontario Superior Court in 1001411 Ontario Limited v. City of Toronto Economic Development Corporation.  This case involved a dispute over a lease agreement that commenced in May, 1994.  The Defendant/Landlord had a right to terminate the agreement on notice, although the contract did not specify any particular timeframe for notice.  Notice was provided by the Defendant, but the Plaintiff/Tenant took the position that the parties had agreed at the outset that the notice period would be 18 months and far less than that was given.  The Plaintiff alleged that the failure to give a full 18 months’ notice constituted a breach by the Defendant of an implied duty of good faith in the implementation of the lease agreement, giving rise to damages.  Continue reading

Entire Agreement Clauses May Not Always Apply

The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Bank of Montreal v. Barber Glass Industries Inc. contains some interesting observations on entire agreement clauses.

In this case, Grant Thornton Limited, a court appointed receiver, entered into an Auction Service Agreement (“ASA”) with a well-known liquidator, Danbury Industrial.  The agreement concerned the sale of assets of a debtor. 

The ASA provided that Danbury would be entitled to a 12% Buyer’s Premium on the sale of the debtor’s assets and envisioned an auction sale.

Where a strict technical construction will produce an unfair result, more often than not the court will find a way around it.

Prior to the auction taking place, Danbury was able to find a purchaser for almost all of the assets by means of a private purchase for $8.5 million.  Danbury entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with the purchaser accordingly.  The agreement made no reference to a Buyer’s Premium.

However, the parties also entered into a bill of sale which was later amended to include a handwritten amendment stating that the purchase price was “inclusive of the Buyer’s Premium”.

After the transaction was completed, Danbury claimed a Buyer’s Premium from the receiver.  The receiver refused to pay and this action started.  Continue reading

Jail Time as the Ultimate Weapon in Debt Collection

There was a time long ago when under common law, judgment debtors could be imprisoned for failing to pay debts.  Obviously, and thankfully, that is no longer true.  However, judgment debtors who ignore court orders made in debt collection proceedings against them do take the risk of jail time as the penalty for their misconduct. 

“I fought the law, and the law won.”

The Rules of Civil Procedure give the court discretion to order incarceration if a party is found to have disobeyed a court Order.  This is most often seen in the context of a judgment creditor attempting to locate assets to satisfy a judgment, and a judgment debtor doing his or her best to frustrate those efforts.

A perfect example is illustrated by the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Doobay v. Diamond

In 2007, the Plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default against Anthony Diamond in the amount of about $850,000.  In May, 2008, Mr. Diamond was examined under oath as part of the Plaintiffs’ efforts to locate assets to satisfy the judgment.  He refused to answer any questions.  Several months later, the Court ordered him to re-attend to answer questions.  As a result, he was examined again in December, 2008.  He still refused to answer a substantial number of questions.  Continue reading

Misrepresentation in the Sale of an Automobile Dealership

The recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Butera v. Mitsubishi features a number of interesting points, not the least of which involves the importance of doing one’s homework before opening a new automobile franchise.  From a legal perspective, the case is interesting because it highlights the difficulty in pinning liability for negligent misrepresentation on a manufacturer entering a new market. 

In 2002, Mr Butera, a young lawyer working in St. Catharines, applied to Mitsubishi Canada for a Mitsubishi dealership which he wished to open in Niagara Falls.  In the proforma sales forecasts that he included with his application, he forecast that he would sell 180 new and 120 used vehicles in his first year of operation and 350 new and 125 used vehicles in an average year. 

Ultimately, he signed a Dealer Agreement with Mitsubishi and opened for business. 

By 2005, less than three years later, he claimed that his losses to date were about $500,000 and growing.  His dealership stopped selling cars in October, 2005, but maintained a service business.  It stopped carrying on business altogether in late 2007.

His sales figures were nowhere near his forecasts.  In 2002, he sold 14 new vehicles.  He sold 127 in 2003, 100 in 2004 and 29 in 2005. 

After closing, he sued various Mitsubishi entities for damages arising out of alleged misrepresentations which he claimed had induced him to enter into the Dealer Agreement. 

Mitsubishi had disclosed its sales levels in the United States and made comments about greatly expanded sales of their cars in the United States and Canada.  Mr. Butera claimed that the statements were flawed and misleading because they did not distinguish between fleet sales and actual sales.  He also claimed that many US sales resulted from a promotion to customers involving favourable credit terms (zero down payment, zero interest and zero payments for one year).  He insisted that all of these statements misled him into entering into the transaction as a result of which he and his companies lost over $3 million. 

On a factual basis, the Court found against Mr. Butera on a number of important points.

Firstly, the Court was satisfied that there was no evidence the statements presented to him of actual US sales were false. 

Secondly, the Court found that Mr. Butera knew or should have known of the distinction between fleet and customer sales and bore the burden of making further inquiry if he felt that it was important.

Finally, the Court determined that less than 1% of total sales of Mitsubishi cars in the United States during the relevant period were sold under the zero, zero, zero financing program. 

The important legal issue of the impact of a possible misrepresentation by Mitsubishi as to projected sales was determined with reference to a clause in the Dealer Agreement usually referred to in legal circles as an “entire agreement” clause.  This provision, which is now almost universal in these types of cases, specifically provided that the written agreement constituted the entire agreement between the parties and superseded any and all prior written or oral agreements or understandings.  This particular clause even provided that:

“Dealer agrees that any oral statements of any MMSCAN personnel shall be of no force or effect and that Dealer has not relied on any such oral statements in entering into this Agreement.”

The Court found that this clause directly impacted the heart of Mr. Butera’s claim, which was that Mitsubishi misrepresented the future prospects of sales of its cars in Canada based on its past performance in the United States.  As a result of the entire agreement clause, the Court found that this was not a viable argument even if Mitsubishi’s representatives had made misrepresentations.

There is another aspect of the case relating to the alleged misrepresentations which is worth noting.

In law, a misrepresentation can only form the basis of a claim if it is a statement relating to an existing and ascertainable fact.  Statements about prospective sales or other future events are regarded by the Court merely as expressions of opinion about the future.  If a vendor provides a forecast and the forecast results are not achieved, the forecast will not constitute an untrue statement of a material fact as a matter of law.  It probably will not constitute a misrepresentation giving rise to liability.  If the vendor negligently misrepresents existing facts, that may be a different story – unless an entire agreement clause applies.  But even an entire agreement clause won’t shield a vendor from an outright lie.

This case highlights the following points:

  1. When a manufacturer provides a forecast as to future results, don’t assume that this will give rise to liability in the event that the forecasts are not met; and
  2. An entire agreement clause will protect a vendor from liability for negligent misrepresentation.

Mr. Butera was buying into what was essentially a new venture.  Had he been buying an existing store and had misrepresentations been made to him about the sales results for the store to date, the result may well have been different if that information had been false.  When starting up a new venture, however, extra care should be taken. 

Unjust Enrichment and Claims Against an Estate

The recent Superior Court decision of Lata v. Rush et al. provides an interesting reminder of how difficult it is to attack a properly prepared Will, and the circumstances under which a claim for unjust enrichment might still be available to someone who feels short-changed by a deceased. 

Helen Oshchytok died in 2001 at the age of 64 for reasons related to her chronic alcoholism. 

Helen had executed a Will in October, 1997 which included a bequest to her relative, the Plaintiff, Leszek Lata, of a house in Etobicoke. 

Three months before her death, in November, 2000, she executed a new Will giving the house to a friend of hers, Dennis Weber.  Her new Will provided that Lata would receive the sum of $50,000 instead of the house.

After her death, Lata sued Weber, another beneficiary, and the lawyer who had drawn the new Will.  The lawyer died before the trial started, and the trial proceeded only against Weber and other beneficiary.

The deceased had never married and had no children.  She had a long history of alcoholism and had been unable to work for many years.  Continue reading

Just Cause for the Termination of Employment: How Serious Does the Misconduct Have to Be?

The recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Barton v. Rona Ontario Inc. sheds interesting light on an issue relating to wrongful dismissal that is rarely articulated.  That issue has to do with the difference between the way in which a company assesses misconduct and its need to respond in a way which sends an appropriate message to its other employees, on the one hand, and the analysis that a court will undertake in assessing the situation, on the other hand.

The Court will not consider the totality of the business reasons why an employer might wish to terminate an employee.

In this case, Mr. Barton was an assistant store manager at a Rona hardware store in Barrie, Ontario. 

In April, 2009, a computerized training program was scheduled to take place at the training centre at the store.  The training centre was on the second floor and not accessible by individuals in wheelchairs. 

One of the store’s employees was a Mr. Malmstrom, who was wheelchair-bound.  He wanted to attend the seminar and the management team at the store wanted to accommodate him.  Unfortunately, there was no conventional way of bringing him up to the second floor of the store.  Continue reading