Misrepresentation in the Sale of an Automobile Dealership

The recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Butera v. Mitsubishi features a number of interesting points, not the least of which involves the importance of doing one’s homework before opening a new automobile franchise.  From a legal perspective, the case is interesting because it highlights the difficulty in pinning liability for negligent misrepresentation on a manufacturer entering a new market. 

In 2002, Mr Butera, a young lawyer working in St. Catharines, applied to Mitsubishi Canada for a Mitsubishi dealership which he wished to open in Niagara Falls.  In the proforma sales forecasts that he included with his application, he forecast that he would sell 180 new and 120 used vehicles in his first year of operation and 350 new and 125 used vehicles in an average year. 

Ultimately, he signed a Dealer Agreement with Mitsubishi and opened for business. 

By 2005, less than three years later, he claimed that his losses to date were about $500,000 and growing.  His dealership stopped selling cars in October, 2005, but maintained a service business.  It stopped carrying on business altogether in late 2007.

His sales figures were nowhere near his forecasts.  In 2002, he sold 14 new vehicles.  He sold 127 in 2003, 100 in 2004 and 29 in 2005. 

After closing, he sued various Mitsubishi entities for damages arising out of alleged misrepresentations which he claimed had induced him to enter into the Dealer Agreement. 

Mitsubishi had disclosed its sales levels in the United States and made comments about greatly expanded sales of their cars in the United States and Canada.  Mr. Butera claimed that the statements were flawed and misleading because they did not distinguish between fleet sales and actual sales.  He also claimed that many US sales resulted from a promotion to customers involving favourable credit terms (zero down payment, zero interest and zero payments for one year).  He insisted that all of these statements misled him into entering into the transaction as a result of which he and his companies lost over $3 million. 

On a factual basis, the Court found against Mr. Butera on a number of important points.

Firstly, the Court was satisfied that there was no evidence the statements presented to him of actual US sales were false. 

Secondly, the Court found that Mr. Butera knew or should have known of the distinction between fleet and customer sales and bore the burden of making further inquiry if he felt that it was important.

Finally, the Court determined that less than 1% of total sales of Mitsubishi cars in the United States during the relevant period were sold under the zero, zero, zero financing program. 

The important legal issue of the impact of a possible misrepresentation by Mitsubishi as to projected sales was determined with reference to a clause in the Dealer Agreement usually referred to in legal circles as an “entire agreement” clause.  This provision, which is now almost universal in these types of cases, specifically provided that the written agreement constituted the entire agreement between the parties and superseded any and all prior written or oral agreements or understandings.  This particular clause even provided that:

“Dealer agrees that any oral statements of any MMSCAN personnel shall be of no force or effect and that Dealer has not relied on any such oral statements in entering into this Agreement.”

The Court found that this clause directly impacted the heart of Mr. Butera’s claim, which was that Mitsubishi misrepresented the future prospects of sales of its cars in Canada based on its past performance in the United States.  As a result of the entire agreement clause, the Court found that this was not a viable argument even if Mitsubishi’s representatives had made misrepresentations.

There is another aspect of the case relating to the alleged misrepresentations which is worth noting.

In law, a misrepresentation can only form the basis of a claim if it is a statement relating to an existing and ascertainable fact.  Statements about prospective sales or other future events are regarded by the Court merely as expressions of opinion about the future.  If a vendor provides a forecast and the forecast results are not achieved, the forecast will not constitute an untrue statement of a material fact as a matter of law.  It probably will not constitute a misrepresentation giving rise to liability.  If the vendor negligently misrepresents existing facts, that may be a different story – unless an entire agreement clause applies.  But even an entire agreement clause won’t shield a vendor from an outright lie.

This case highlights the following points:

  1. When a manufacturer provides a forecast as to future results, don’t assume that this will give rise to liability in the event that the forecasts are not met; and
  2. An entire agreement clause will protect a vendor from liability for negligent misrepresentation.

Mr. Butera was buying into what was essentially a new venture.  Had he been buying an existing store and had misrepresentations been made to him about the sales results for the store to date, the result may well have been different if that information had been false.  When starting up a new venture, however, extra care should be taken. 

Unjust Enrichment and Claims Against an Estate

The recent Superior Court decision of Lata v. Rush et al. provides an interesting reminder of how difficult it is to attack a properly prepared Will, and the circumstances under which a claim for unjust enrichment might still be available to someone who feels short-changed by a deceased. 

Helen Oshchytok died in 2001 at the age of 64 for reasons related to her chronic alcoholism. 

Helen had executed a Will in October, 1997 which included a bequest to her relative, the Plaintiff, Leszek Lata, of a house in Etobicoke. 

Three months before her death, in November, 2000, she executed a new Will giving the house to a friend of hers, Dennis Weber.  Her new Will provided that Lata would receive the sum of $50,000 instead of the house.

After her death, Lata sued Weber, another beneficiary, and the lawyer who had drawn the new Will.  The lawyer died before the trial started, and the trial proceeded only against Weber and other beneficiary.

The deceased had never married and had no children.  She had a long history of alcoholism and had been unable to work for many years.  Continue reading

Just Cause for the Termination of Employment: How Serious Does the Misconduct Have to Be?

The recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Barton v. Rona Ontario Inc. sheds interesting light on an issue relating to wrongful dismissal that is rarely articulated.  That issue has to do with the difference between the way in which a company assesses misconduct and its need to respond in a way which sends an appropriate message to its other employees, on the one hand, and the analysis that a court will undertake in assessing the situation, on the other hand.

The Court will not consider the totality of the business reasons why an employer might wish to terminate an employee.

In this case, Mr. Barton was an assistant store manager at a Rona hardware store in Barrie, Ontario. 

In April, 2009, a computerized training program was scheduled to take place at the training centre at the store.  The training centre was on the second floor and not accessible by individuals in wheelchairs. 

One of the store’s employees was a Mr. Malmstrom, who was wheelchair-bound.  He wanted to attend the seminar and the management team at the store wanted to accommodate him.  Unfortunately, there was no conventional way of bringing him up to the second floor of the store.  Continue reading

Costs and Class Actions

When I first started receiving referral work from American lawyers many years ago, I became aware that for the most part, American litigants are responsible for bearing their own legal costs.  I found many American lawyers surprised to find that this is not the case in Ontario. 

As Canadian litigants are well (and often painfully) aware, a court will have discretion at the end of a case to award costs as it sees fit.  In almost every case, costs are awarded in favour of the successful party. 

What is less commonly understood by non-lawyers is that “costs” to be paid by the losing party is not the same as requiring the losing party to pay all of the winning party’s legal expenses.  The normal rule is that the loser must pay what is referred to as partial indemnity costs – roughly a percentage, usually between 50% and 2/3, of the winning party’s legal expenses. 

This rule applies not only to cases that have been concluded by a trial, but also to motions.  Typically, the winner of a motion is also entitled to partial indemnity costs.  Continue reading

Adverse Possession and the Effect of Mutual Mistake

The recent Superior Court decision of Chen v. Stafford, released on July 4, 2012, contains an interesting review of the law of adverse possession and particularly the impact of mutual mistake in adverse possession cases. 

What is the result if both the claimant and the true owner are genuinely under the impression that the disputed land actually belongs to the claimant, i.e. the true owner does not realize the disputed land is included within his title.

I have conducted a number of trials involving adverse possession claims.  I have thoroughly enjoyed them.  They usually require all kinds of investigative work as part of the preparation for trial, including the obtaining of testimony from elderly people who seem to remember where a fence was put up or taken down decades earlier, or the approximate time that a particular oak tree was planted. 

I have always been struck by the extent to which neighbouring land owners, usually on a country lake with 200 feet of property along the shore, will spend weeks in court and tens of thousands of dollars litigating over a 2 foot strip running along their mutual boundary. 

In any event, Chen v. Stafford was a case involving a disputed area between neighbouring parcels of land fronting on the St. Lawrence River in the Kingston, Ontario area.  The Applicants brought the proceeding for an Order declaring that they had acquired title to the disputed area by virtue of their exclusive use and possession of the area for over 50 years.  Continue reading

An Interesting Aspect of our Canada Customs Exemptions

It is trite to say that there has been a renewed interest in cross-border shopping since the Canadian dollar began to gain strength against the US dollar some time ago.

Although I have not studied the statistics, I would bet that the recent increase in exemptions for Canadian travellers purchasing items outside of the country is resulting in further cross-border activity. 

Most people interested in the subject know, for example, that a Canadian traveller returning after an absence of 24 hours can now bring back $200 worth of goods exempt from duty.  That figure has been increased recently from the previous $50.

Travellers away for 48 hours can now bring back $800 worth of goods as opposed to the former $200.

All of this has been announced and repeated over and over again in the media.  What nobody seems to have reported, however, is what happens if you exceed the new exemptions. 

When the 48-hour exemption was $200, and a traveller brought back $300 worth of goods, the traveller would be obliged to pay HST and any duty on the $100 excess.  The traveller would be given credit for his or her $200 exemption. 

As matters stand today, the same principle applies.  A traveller away 48 hours can bring back up to $800 worth of goods without any additional payment.  If the traveller brings back $900 worth of goods, duty/HST is calculated on the excess of $100. 

One would have assumed, perhaps, that the same rule would apply to a traveller who is away only 24 hours.  Under the current regime, there is a $200 exemption.  Let’s say the traveller is away for 24 hours and brings back $300 worth of goods.  One might assume that he would be given credit for the $200 exemption and assessed duty/HST on only the excess of $100. 

Guess what.

That is not correct.  In the case of a traveller away only 24 hours, if the traveller exceeds the $200 exemption, duty/HST is calculated on the entire amount of the purchase.  There is no credit at all for the $200 exemption that otherwise would have applied.  Note that this is not the rule for a traveller away 48 hours or more.  It only applies to the traveller away only 24 hours.

So in essence, for someone away only one night, the fact that there has been a recent increase in the exemption is completely irrelevant if the exemption is exceeded. 

So for all you outlet mall shopaholics out there, take note – either stay away longer or watch your spending!

Bankruptcy is Not Always the Way Out of Trouble

In the interesting case of Indcondo Building Corporation v. Sloan, released July 18, 2012, the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with a situation in which a couple attempted to use the bankruptcy process to avoid an action attacking the husband’s transfer of his matrimonial home to his wife as a fraudulent conveyance. 

In 2001, Indcondo Building Corporation obtained a judgment against one David Sloan for about $8 million.  After obtaining the judgment, Indcondo found out that Mr. Sloan had transferred title to his home to his wife about 45 days after having been served with the Statement of Claim issued by Indcondo. 

A couple attempted to use the bankruptcy process to avoid an action attacking the husband’s transfer of his matrimonial home to his wife as a fraudulent conveyance.

As a result, in 2002, Indcondo sued the Sloans to set aside that transfer as a fraudulent conveyance. 

Two years later, Mr. Sloan declared bankruptcy.  That had the effect of bringing Indcondo’s action to a halt. 

Shortly thereafter, Indcondo asked the Trustee in Bankruptcy whether or not he planned to continue the attack on the conveyance of the matrimonial home.  The Trustee indicated that because the estate had no money, any such action would have to be undertaken by Mr. Sloan’s creditors.  Continue reading