The Cruel World of Insurance Policies

In the recent case of Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v All Spec Home Inspections and Mario Lucciola, the Court considered the availability of insurance coverage to a home inspector who missed a critical electrical problem on a home inspection resulting in a contractor’s death. At the very end of the decision, the Judge made reference to the “cruel world of claims-made-and-reported policies of insurance.” While colourful language of this nature is not unusual for the particular Judge in this case, it is not language that one sees very often.  Nevertheless, the facts of this case show how appropriate they are.

Mr. Lucciola, a self-employed home inspector, conducted an inspection of a property in St. Catharines in July 2010.  At the time, Mr. Lucciola had professional liability insurance on the basis of a one-year term renewed annually through to 2011.

Mr. Lucciola produced a report and photographs, making no reference whatsoever to any electrical problems.

On August 16, 2010, a contractor was doing work in the attic of the property.  He came into contact with an exposed energized bare copper wire.  He was electrocuted and he died.

Three days later, on August 19, 2010, Mr. Lucciola signed an application for professional liability insurance as he had done every year since 2006.  His insurance application required him to indicate whether or not any claim had been made against him in the last five years, and whether or not he was aware of any situation or circumstance which may result in a claim in the future.  Mr. Lucciola answered “no” to both questions.

The policy was then issued for a further period of one year.

Several days later, Mr. Lucciola was interviewed by an investigator for the Ministry of Labour, at which time he was asked whether or not he had noticed the wire in the attic. He indicated first that he had not noticed it and subsequently that he had but that he had tested it with an electrical tester and received no response from it.  For that reason, he had not made any note of it in his report.

About a year later, the Ministry of Labour conducted an inquest.  Subsequently, Mr. Lucciola signed yet another application for insurance.  It contained the same questions and he answered them in the same way.  Accordingly, a policy was issued for a further one year.

All of these policies contained language to the effect that if the insurer subsequently became aware that if any of these questions had been answered incorrectly, there would be no coverage for any claim or action emanating from a fact or circumstance that the applicant failed to mention in his application.

A lawsuit was subsequently brought against Mr. Lucciola.  He notified his insurer of the claim.  The insurer brought this application for an order that it had no obligation to provide insurance coverage.

The Court had little difficulty concluding that Mr. Lucciola should have known of the potential claim against him when he made his application for the insurance policy that was in effect at the time that he was sued, and should have answered “yes” to that question on his application.  As a result, the Court ruled that the insurer was entitled to deny coverage.

The interesting point in this case has to do with the type of insurance policy that was in place.  Mr. Lucciola’s policy was a “claims-made-and-reported” insurance policy, rather than an occurrence policy.  These are very different.  In a claims-made-and-reported policy, it is the transmittal to the insurer of notice of the claim that invokes coverage.  In an occurrence policy, coverage goes into effect when the incident upon which the claim is based actually takes place.

In this case, the incident (the contractor’s death) took place in August 2010.  The policy in place at that time had been applied for by Mr. Lucciola in 2009.  In 2009, when he answered “no” to the questions as to whether or not he was aware of a possible claim, he was being entirely accurate.  Had his policy been an occurrence policy, the insurer would have had to provide coverage.

In this case, however, the policy in place when coverage was invoked was the policy in effect at the time that Mr. Lucciola notified his insurer of the claim.  In applying for that policy, Mr. Lucciola had answered “no” to questions that should have been answered “yes”.  For that reason alone, Mr. Lucciola was disentitled to coverage.

This is obviously a critical distinction.  If you have professional liability insurance coverage, and you are not aware of the type of policy that protects you, this case is a good lesson on the importance of finding that out and keeping it in mind.

Legal Proceedings and the Middle Class

In an article posted recently in the online version of Canadian Lawyer, Margaret Waddell put forward a proposal which she entitled “A Radical Idea for Giving the Average Person Their Day in Court”.

In her article, she suggested that asking whether or not the average person can afford a trial is the wrong question.  Instead, we should ask ourselves whether we can afford to maintain a judicial system that effectively bars the average person from being able to take his or her civil dispute to trial with the benefit of legal representation.

There is simply no question about the fact that the average person is going to have a lot of difficulty paying for a lawyer to take a matter to trial, assuming that by “average person”, we are talking about someone who earns at the level of Canada’s national income.

Litigation lawyers charge their time out at varying rates, generally dependent upon experience and, to some extent, geography. On balance, in my view, one gets what one pays for. That does not mean that a person will only be able to get proper or even adequate representation by paying top dollar.  I know many young litigation lawyers, including those at my own law firm, who can do an excellent job at a reasonably hourly rate.  My definition of “reasonable”, however, may not be shared by everyone.  Even young lawyers can be costly for average income earners.

For those whose incomes are below average but nowhere near the poverty line, the justice system approaches complete inaccessibility.  Family law courts in particular are inundated with cases where at least one of the two parties are unrepresented.  Where an unrepresented party must go into battle against a lawyer acting on the other side, the result can be devastating.  What may be even worse is that the unrepresented party will usually leave the courtroom without the first clue as to what just happened to him or her, or what he or she could have done prior to the hearing in order to increase the odds of success.

In smaller claims, an attempt has been made to address the point by increasing the Small Claims Court jurisdiction to $25,000.00.  The Small Claims Court is designed for people to be able to represent themselves without counsel.  While I do not have any statistics to offer, I have to believe that this has made a positive difference.

Ms. Waddell’s radical idea, incidentally, is that every lawyer ought to choose a case in which the client cannot afford to proceed and agree to act without charging a fee, or at a substantially reduced rate, or on a contingency.  By doing so, she suggests, the client can be shown that he or she is not a faceless commodity and that the legal profession is still prepared to help the average Canadian to obtain access to justice.

Ms. Waddell’s proposal is a laudable one but, I fear, unlikely to gain traction.  While many law firms would be prepared to consider acting without charge where doing so serves the public interest, or where humanitarian considerations exist, the idea of ignoring economic realities out of general principle is not likely to be viewed favourably by very many lawyers.

In my view, a better answer is to pursue the policy that gave rise to the increase in the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction by making it easier for people to represent themselves.  The first step to be taken in that process, as far as I am concerned, is to simplify the route which one must take to get to trial.

The need for simplification is nowhere clearer than in the family law context where, as I have indicated, many cases involve unrepresented parties.  Although I do not practice in the family law area, I have been present in Family Law Court and I have been astonished at the inability or the unwillingness of judges to take into account the fact that they are speaking to unrepresented litigants who are familiar with neither the procedure nor the jargon associated with court proceedings.  These are people who leave the courtroom completely mystified and, even worse, feeling as if they have no chance of ever receiving what they would consider to be their day in court.  I would bet that if the stakes were not so high, many would just give up.

I do not believe that lawyers are going to be increasing the number of pro bono cases they take on any time soon.  As Ms. Waddell points out and as many of us know, we do have a problem with access to justice.  In my view, the answer is to increase the opportunities for people to represent themselves where they choose to do so either because they cannot afford a lawyer or for any other reason.  This means, firstly, that the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, with its enormously simplified procedures, should be increased even further.

Secondly, parties involved in disputes in that court should be expected to represent themselves.  Indeed, a party wishing to be represented by counsel should have to demonstrate a need for such representation by satisfying a judge, on motion, that the party is incapable of representing himself or herself.

Thirdly, and specifically with respect to parties involved in matrimonial disputes, the process must be simplified.  In that respect, I am not talking about even more steps designed to encourage or, as some might say, coerce parties into attending endless settlement conferences and discouraging them from ever actually entering into a courtroom to have a dispute resolved once and for all.  I am talking about simplifying the rules, eliminating unnecessary steps, and translating the rules into plain English so that people understand what they can expect in a courtroom, and what will be expected of them.